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CHARTING SUPREME COURT PATENT LAW, NEAR AND FAR
JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER*
I would not care to match wits with Seth Waxman, one of the leading
Supreme Court advocates practicing in the United States today.1 I am willing, however, to proffer an epigram I find no less fitting than the one with
which he began.2 Mine: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”—the
more it changes, the more it’s the same thing.3 When we take a longer view
of the Supreme Court’s opinions in patent cases and other intellectual property law cases, we can see vital continuities that run through this body of
judge-made law, binding it together in a stable fabric. It is a longer view that
I offer here, based on a citation study of cases that uses network-analysis
metrics and force-mapping data visualization tools.4 I examine the 1947–
2017 span, as well as the half-spans from 1947 to 1982, and from 1982 to
2017. This embraces both the 35-year period following the Federal Circuit’s

* Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Many thanks, for helpful feedback, to Greg Reilly and
Tim Holbrook. ã Joseph Scott Miller.
1. See generally Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8, 2014,
10:30 AM GMT) (reporting results of an empirical study of private-lawyer success rates in petitioning
for U.S. Supreme Court review from 2004 to 2012), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/. According to WilmerHale’s web site, Mr. Waxman, a partner there, has argued 75 cases at
the Supreme Court to date. https://www.wilmerhale.com/seth_waxman/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
2. Seth P. Waxman, May You Live In Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 17
CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 214, 214 (2017).
3. Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes [The Wasps], Jan. 1849. Scanned copies of the work
are readily available at https://archive.org. In the 1862 printing of Series 6, the epigram appears at the end
of the first full paragraph on page 305, https://archive.org/details/lesgupes06karruoft. Cf. Mark A Lemley,
The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“Despite the undeniable
significance of these changes . . . something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of
the patent ecosystem during this period [from the 1990s to 2015]: very little. Whether we look at the
number of patent applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the patentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very little evidence that
patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of changes in the law. The patent system,
in other words, seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law.”).
4. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme
Court IP Decisions? A Citation Study, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–15, 29–43 (2017) (describing and
applying these network-analysis metrics and data-visualization tools to a smaller citation study of U.S.
Supreme Court opinions in intellectual property law cases decided from October 1994 to June 2017).
377
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creation in 19825—the focus of Waxman’s reflections6—and the 35-year period leading to that 1982 turning point.
1. There are two points on which Waxman and I entirely agree. First,
he notes the “uptick” in the Supreme Court’s patent-case rate, during a time
when the overall number of the Court’s merits cases has declined.7 Waxman
compares the 17 patent cases decided from 1983 to 2006, or about 0.7 cases
per year, to the 33 cases decided from 2006 to 2017, or 3 cases per year. One
can also consider the rolling five-year average of patent cases per Supreme
Court term, to gauge change annually. By my count, the rolling five-year
average of Supreme Court patent cases is, after the October 2016 Term, at 4
per Term8—a level not seen since the 1940s.9 Copyright and trademark
cases, by contrast, are at a rolling five-year average of 2 cases per Term combined, suggesting that there is not simply an increased interest in, or recognition of the importance of, all intellectual property cases equally.10 Since
the October 2005 Term, patent cases dominate the Court’s IP docket to a
notable degree.
Second, as Waxman observes, “[o]verwhelmingly, what matters to the
Court are its own cases and the express statutory text.”11 Multiple citation
studies show that supreme courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, generally cite their own cases more often than those of any other court.12 That
pattern holds in the Court’s intellectual property cases from 1994 to 2017.13
“Any court with a significant stock of its own opinions shows a marked preference for citing them.”14
Perhaps he and I also agree that the greater number of recent Supreme
Court patent-law decisions is neither all boon nor all bane. Waxman does,
however, urge the Court to slow its patent-law roll: “I hope that, going forward, the Court will take stock of the substantial changes it has already

5. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982); see generally Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-And
Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 543, 553–57 (1983) (describing the then-new Federal Circuit’s creation).
6. Waxman, supra note 2, at 215 & n.8.
7. Id. at 215–16.
8. Miller, supra note 4, at 3 & fig.1.
9. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 518, 520–22 & figs.1, 2 (2010) (reporting per-Term patent-case rates from 1810 to 2007).
10. Miller, supra note 4, at 3 & fig.1.
11. Waxman, supra note 2, at 222.
12. Miller, supra note 4, at 6–8 (discussing four such studies).
13. Id. at 19–20 (reporting citation data for such cases).
14. William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94
L. LIB . J. 267, 269 (2002). Manz reports, for example, that “almost 70% of the cases cited in the Court’s
majority opinions during the 1996 Term were Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 269–70 & tbl.3.
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wrought and their effect as it considers further adjustments.”15 He grounds
the recommendation in concerns about the greater pace of change (“the pace
of change has been so rapid that no one knows the full effect of the Court’s
decisions”16), as well as the direction of change (“general impressions that
something is not right in the state of patent law seem to have contributed
over time to a greater willingness to second-guess the Federal Circuit”17) and
the character of change (“reflect[ing] the age-old debate about rules and
standards,” the “Federal Circuit has traditionally been more inclined to adopt
rules,” whereas the “Supreme Court, by contrast, has a high tolerance for
uncertainty”18).
My view of the desirability of continued Supreme Court review of multiple patent cases per Term is much closer to that of Federal Circuit Judge
Dyk: “Supreme Court review of [Federal Circuit patent] cases is both essential and highly beneficial.”19 That review cannot help but change patent doctrine, to be sure.20 But some of the change simply returned patent law to the
course that the Supreme Court had already set, and that the Federal Circuit
had failed to heed. For example, in TC Heartland, a unanimous Supreme
Court restored the patent venue statute’s “resides” clause to the construction
the Court had given it six decades earlier.21 In KSR, a unanimous Court restored to the nonobviousness inquiry the “expansive and flexible approach”

15. Waxman, supra note 2, at 219–220 (“One solution would be for the Court to pause for a time
and let the changes it has already made sink in.”).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 219.
18. Id. at 221. The ‘Federal Circuit rules v. Supreme Court standards’ contrast can be overdrawn.
The Court does sometimes prefer standards to rules, as Waxman describes. Id. at 220–21. But sometimes
the Court prefers a rule to a standard, as in the “on-sale bar” context. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S.
55, 65–66 & n.11 (1998) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “totality of the circumstances” test in favor of a
two-step “ready for patenting” test). More importantly, many of the Court’s recent patent cases are not
fought on the ‘rules v. standards’ field at all, involving issues such as: the scope of Seventh Amendment
jury rights, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); interactions between the Patent
Act and other federal statutes, e.g., Caraco Pharma. Labs. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012);
the scope of federal jurisdiction, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); burdens of proof, e.g.,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); the scope of judicial review
of agency action, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1990); the scope of indirect infringement liability, e.g., Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); and the presumption against extraterritorial effect for federal statutes, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
19. Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 83–84 (2016).
20. See id. at 72–77 (discussing some of these changes).
21. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516–17 (2017) (“In
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957), this Court concluded that for
purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 1400(b) a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation. . . .
We conclude that the amendments to [28 U.S.C.] § 1391 did not modify the meaning of § 1400(b) as
interpreted by Fourco. We therefore hold that a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.”).

380

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:2

the Court had prescribed four decades earlier in Graham.22 In Festo, a unanimous Court restored the prosecution-history-estoppel inquiry to a calibration method the Court had endorsed six decades earlier in Exhibit Supply and
refined just five years before in Warner-Jenkinson.23 These are doctrinal
changes of a kind, but they also reflect a deeper continuity in the structural
relationship between the Supreme Court and the subordinate federal courts
in the construction and application of federal law. And even in a case that
turns on a patent-law question that the Court has not previously considered—
such as the laches question at the heart of SCA Hygiene,24 as Waxman describes—the structural principle should inform parties’ expectations about
the contours of patent doctrine. Until the Supreme Court settles a patent law
question, that question is not fully settled, as the Supreme Court itself stated
plainly in 1888.25 Professor Robin Feldman’s assessment of the October
2013 Term’s patent cases rings true, to me, more broadly: “[A] strong message echoes through the six Supreme Court decisions. It is a message about
restraint, about carefully constructed logic, and about coming into the fold
of judicial decision-making.”26
Patent law is still law—exclusively federal law, at that. The Supreme
Court oversees a complex set of interactions among legislative settlements
of general policy directives,27 executive administration under these

22. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the rigid
approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness,
our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals
applied its TSM test here. . . . [T]he principles laid down in Graham [v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966)] reaffirmed the ‘functional approach’ of Hotchkiss [v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851)].
To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive.”) (internal citation omitted).
23. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737–41 (2002) (discussing Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and Exhibit Supply Co. v.
Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942)).
24. SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Prods., 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).
25. See Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716–17 (1888) (“A question arising in regard to the
construction of a statute of the United States concerning patents for inventions cannot be regarded as
judicially settled when it has not been so settled by the highest judicial authority which can pass upon the
question. . . . No question arising in any such case, reviewable by this court, can be regarded as finally
settled, so as to establish the law for like cases, until it has been determined by this court.”).
26. Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 27, 27–28 (2014).
27. The Patent Act’s text is quite open textured, more like the Sherman Act than the Internal Revenue Code. See John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure
in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 37 (2007) (“Although patent law is a creature
of federal statute, it has long been dominated by judicially-created common law. As in antitrust (that
‘other’ branch of federal monopoly law), the key statutory provisions fairly exude ambiguity.”); see also
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (same).
This is another point on which Waxman and I agree. See Waxman, supra note 2, at 222–23 (noting that
“the Patent Act is notably not a comprehensive statement of patent law,” and that “[m]any patent doctrines, arising from tort and equity, are not included in the text at all”).

2018

CHARTING SUPREME COURT PATENT LAW, NEAR AND FAR

381

directives (albeit through a federal agency that is, compared to most, weak28),
and judicial dispute resolution within that matrix of legislative and administrative material. The Court is playing its familiar role as the highest judicial
tribunal responsible for the reasoned elaboration of federal law, including
the federal law of judiciary-agency relations. It is supervising not only patent
law, but also patent law, particularly the patent system’s public infrastructure. From this perspective, it is critically important that the Court’s regular
review of patent cases should continue at a pace the Court itself thinks adequate.
The Court’s sense of its structural role may also help explain another
facet of its increased engagement with patent law—namely, the higher unanimity rate in these cases, together with the trademark and copyright cases.
Waxman notes the high degree of agreement in the Court’s 2016–17 patent
cases,29 but the phenomenon is more widespread than that. Consider the
Court’s 73 patent, trademark, and copyright cases from the October 1994
Term30 through the October 2016 Term, inclusive. (A list of the cases, with
the vote split in each, is set forth in the Appendix to this paper.) Patent cases
dominate the group, with 47; trademark (14) and copyright (12) together
comprise 26. Across these cases, the Court shows a remarkable level of internal agreement. Among the patent cases, 31 of 47 (66%) drew no dissent.
Among all the IP cases together, 47 of 73 (64%) drew no dissent. For comparison, the unanimity rate across all the Court’s merits cases, in recent decades, hovers at about 40%.31 Waxman “find[s] it puzzling and somewhat

28. “Unlike the sweeping delegations [to agencies] conferred in the Progressive and New Deal eras,
the delegations of governmental power for the patent system were, and still are, extraordinarily narrow.”
John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1133 (2000). The PTO may be stronger, at least in some
discrete areas, due to broader rulemaking authority conferred by the 2011 America Invents Act. See
Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016) (using Chevron deference, a familiar
feature of judicial review of agency substantive rules, to affirm a PTO rule for construing patent scope
during inter partes review of an issued patent under the America Invents Act); see also John M. Golden,
Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1671–91 (2016) (discussing
judicial review of agency action in the PTO context, including changes occasioned by the America Invents Act); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609 (2012) (same).
29. Waxman, supra note 2, at 222.
30. The October 1994 Term marks an inflection point in the Supreme Court’s appetite for patent
cases: “the 1994 Term was the beginning of a long-term trend. While the Court had decided only five
patent cases in the first dozen Terms in which the Federal Circuit was in existence, its next five patent
cases were decided in the four Terms after 1994 (1995–1998, inclusive). . . . In its next ten Terms (1999–
2008, inclusive), the Justices would hear argument and issue opinions in eleven more Federal Circuit
patent cases. Thus, unlike its anemic average . . . during the 1983–1994 Terms, the Court in the years
since 1994 has averaged more than one patent case per Term . . . .” Duffy, supra note 9, at 523–24 (footnotes omitted).
31. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 125–26 & fig.3.1 (upper right panel, labeled “Unanimous Maximum”). Put
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troubling” that the votes in the patent cases seem “lopsided,” worrying that,
without the disciplining “internal check” of a “robust dissent,” any “soft
spots in the majority’s reasoning are less likely to be rectified”—and expressing the related fear that the resulting opinions are, in effect, too short.32
This may be cause for concern. At the same time, the more common criticism
of the Court is that its opinions have become too long, complex, and fractured: “Many commentators contend Supreme Court opinions are excessively long and argue longer opinions result in a variety of negative consequences.”33 Among them is the risk of greater confusion in the lower courts,
which itself may widen lower-court judges’ discretion in how they implement those Supreme Court decisions in subsequent cases.34 As reporter
Adam Liptak pointedly observed in 2010, at a time when the Court “often
provides only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts” and “increasingly does so at enormous length,” it is well to remember that “Brown v.
Board of Education . . . managed to do its work in fewer than 4,000 words.”35
2. On the terrain Waxman deftly describes, we have common ground.
The Court is hearing more patent cases, focusing most on its own precedents
when it does so, and deciding them with greater unanimity than is typical of
the Court’s recent output. We also have some differences, where Waxman
sees both more change, and more rapid change, than do I. In what remains,
my goal is to shift the terrain, looking at the Court’s IP cases over a longer
time span, from 1947 to 2017, and from a citations-analysis perspective. My
examination of the Court’s citations to its own cases in this period persuades
me that the recent changes in patent doctrine occur within a larger matrix of
stability and continuity. In a snapshot of any short period, because the Court
is deciding a cohort of discrete legal questions that may differ from the questions in some other short period, the pattern of cited precedents may seem to
vary sharply. Viewed over a longer time period, however, the Court’s citations show that it weaves each new case into the dense tapestry of existing

differently, since about 1950, about 60% of all the Court’s cases contain at least one dissent. Id. at 68 &
fig.2.1.
32. Waxman, supra note 2, at 222 (“Altogether, the Court’s opinions in the four patent cases I
argued last Term fill only 29 pages of the Supreme Court Reports, and the vast majority of those pages
simply recited the relevant facts and legal principles.”).
33. Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court
Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 627 (2008) (reporting a comprehensive empirical study of the length of
Supreme Court opinions and how it has changed over time).
34. Id. at 628 (describing this risk).
35. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html. The opinion
in Brown, excluding the syllabus and lawyers’ names, occupies 11 pages in the official reporter. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486–96 (1954).
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decisional law. The tapestry endures, even as it changes gradually in the embrace of new threads.
By way of background, it is simple enough to think of a set of judicial
decisions and the citations linking them to one another as a network, with the
cases as nodes in the network and the citations as edges connecting them.36
Quantitative study of large case-law citation networks, however, is still quite
new. Indeed, “until recently, large-scale analysis of citation practices were
impractical; data was difficulty to acquire, analysis methods were rudimentary, and computational power was insufficient.”37 Happily, “[i]n the last
decade, all three of the barriers to large-scale empirical citation analysis have
been greatly reduced.”38 I have performed a citation-network analysis of the
Supreme Court’s IP cases from 1994 to 2017 and draw on that work here.39
Two network-analysis studies of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, both led
by political scientist Professor James Fowler,40 provide the foundation for
the network analyses I present below. A critical feature of network analysis
is that it allows one to differentiate nodes by their relative importance to—
their centrality41 in—the network. For example, both Fowler studies proceed
from the premise that “[a] citation analysis is an ideal way to tap ‘case importance’ . . . define[d] as the legal relevance of a case for the network of law
at the Supreme Court.”42 Because we can treat “a citation to a precedent as a
latent judgment by a judge regarding the relevance of the case for helping to
resolve a legal dispute,” it is “reasonable to determine how relevant a particular opinion is by considering how,” in granular detail, “it is embedded in
the broader network of opinions comprising the law.”43 The Fowler studies
36. See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 316–17 (2007) (“A network is just a set of items, termed nodes or vertices, with connections among them, termed links or edges.
Networks are mathematical objects, but there are concrete examples everywhere. . . . The Web of Law is
the network that consists of cases and other legal authorities, such as statutes, treatises, and law review
articles (the nodes), and the citations that link them to one another.”) (emphases in original) (footnote
omitted).
37. Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of Information, 9
ELON L. REV. 115, 120 (2017).
38. Id.
39. See Miller, supra note 4, at 10–15 (reviewing the key concepts and tools for conducting network
analysis of case-law citation networks); see also Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Promises and Challenges of Legal Network Analysis, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 539, 547–50 (reviewing legal citation network
studies).
40. See James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC.
NETWORKS 16 (2008); see also James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the
Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007).
41. “A large volume of research on networks has been devoted to the concept of centrality. This
research addresses the question, ‘Which are the most important or central vertices in a network?’” M.E.J.
NEWMAN, NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION 168 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
42. Fowler et al., supra note 40, at 325.
43. Id. at 326.
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use mathematical tools developed to analyze social networks to map the case
citation network “among all majority opinions released by the U.S. Supreme
Court between 1791 and 2005.”44
“There are of course many possible definitions of importance, and correspondingly many centrality measures for networks.”45 One way to quantify
centrality, for each case/node in the network, is with a count of the links the
case possesses. “The total number of links leading to and from each node is
the ‘degree,’ where the in degree is the total number of inward citations and
the out degree is the total number of outward citations.”46 It is “[p]erhaps the
simplest centrality measure in a network,” and doubtless “it can be very illuminating.”47 For example, in a body of scholarly literature, “[t]he number of
citations a paper receives from other papers, which is simply its in-degree in
the citation network, gives a crude measure of whether the paper has been
influential or not and is widely used as a metric for judging the impact of
scientific research.”48 And just so with a citation network that transits a set
of judicial opinions: “At the most basic level one might use the number of
inward citations, or degree centrality, to measure the importance of a given
decision.”49
As the Fowler studies discuss, however, degree centrality is
a second best, precisely because it treats every citing case’s
citation to a target case as having the same weight as every
other—even though the very citation network under examination can provide information that negates the premise. As
Fowler and Jeon explain, this measure does not fully use information in the precedent network because it treats all inward citations in exactly the same way. Ideally, we should
be able to use information we obtain about the importance
of cited cases to improve our estimate of the importance of
the cases that they cite. For example, suppose decision i is
44. Id. at 327. The second of the studies uses a larger set of cases, but the addition of these cases
from the mid-1700s contributes only minimally to the resulting citation network. Fowler & Jeon, supra
note 40, at 18 & n.2.
45. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 168–69; see also Iain Carmichael et al., Comment, Examining the
Evolution of Legal Precedent Through Citation Network Analysis, 96 N.C. L. REV. 227, 230 (2017)
(“There are many different ways to quantify the importance of a vertex in a network, called vertex centrality metrics.”).
46. Fowler et al., supra note 40, at 328.
47. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169; see also Carmichael et al., supra note 45, at 230 (“Two of the
simplest vertex centrality metrics are in-degree and out-degree.”).
48. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169.
49. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 20.

2018

CHARTING SUPREME COURT PATENT LAW, NEAR AND FAR

385

cited by a case that is considered to be very important and
decision j is cited by a case that is not. This suggests that
decision i may itself be more important than decision j.50
To illustrate this shortcoming of degree centrality using the network of
Supreme Court IP cases that I analyze in detail below, consider Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,51 a case involving a “human cannonball”
performer’s right-of-publicity claim against a broadcast television station.
To date, the Supreme Court has cited Zacchini in two subsequent IP cases—
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises52 (a copyright fair use
case), and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee53 (a congressionally-mandated-trademark case). In this network,
Zacchini has a degree centrality score of two, with Harper & Row and SFAA
each contributing one point. To date, however, the Supreme Court has cited
Harper & Row in eight subsequent IP cases,54 but cited SFAA in only two
subsequent IP cases.55 The degree centrality metric makes no use of that information, even though the greater weight of Harper & Row, compared to
SFAA, is evident in the very citation network they share with Zacchini.
There is need, then, of a centrality metric that does value inward citations according to the centrality of the cases from which they originate. There
is more than one available.56 The Fowler studies test the utility, for judicial
case-citation networks, of a centrality metric that information scientist Professor Jon Kleinberg developed to organize web pages for topical searches.57
The metric, now known in the network-analysis literature as “hubs and
50. Id. at 20.
51. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The federal question in Zacchini was whether the broadcaster’s free press
rights to publish news about the performance immunized it against the performer’s right-of-publicity
claim. Id. at 565–66. The Court’s answer, in brief, was “no.”
52. 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985).
53. 483 U.S. 522, 533 (1987).
54. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2002); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.3 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991);
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 n.19 (1987); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985).
55. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
56. See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169–81 (describing eigenvector, Katz, PageRank, and hubs &
authorities centrality measures); see also Carmichael et al., supra note 45, at 237–38 (discussing the “class
of eigenvector centrality metrics,” which “judge a case to be more important if it is cited by many cases
that are themselves cited by many other cases” and include “PageRank, Eigenvector centrality, and hubs
and authorities”) (footnotes omitted).
57. See Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. ASSOC. FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY 604, 605 (1999) (“In particular, we focus on the use of links for analyzing the
collection of pages relevant to a broad search topic, and for discovering the most ‘authoritative’ pages on
such topics.”).
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authorities,” is the output of “a centrality algorithm called hyperlink-induced
topic search or HITS.”58
Fowler and Jeon explain the Kleinberg algorithm’s capacity “to draw
on both inward and outward citations for assessing importance,”59 in a manner that is readily accessible even to one who cannot write an implementing
algorithm. Specifically:
A hub is a case that cites many other decisions, helping to
define which legally relevant decisions are pertinent to a
given precedent, while an authority is a case that is widely
cited by other decisions. Most cases act as both hubs and
authorities, and the degree to which cases fulfill these roles
is mutually reinforcing within the precedent network. A case
that is a good hub cites many good authorities, and a case
that is a good authority is cited by many good hubs. . . . The
resulting [numerical] hub and authority scores allow us to
identify the key precedents in the network—precedents that
are influential (authorities) and precedents that are well
founded in law (hubs).60
Using the authority or hub scores computed for each node in a casecitation network, then, one can rank order the included cases by importance.61 Fowler and Jeon, to test the validity of authority score as a centrality metric, used the subject-matter categories tracked in the Spaeth Supreme Court Database62 to identify the top five cases by authority score, from
1953 to 2000, in four topical areas.63 Those same cases are highlighted for
importance in expert-opinion-based guides: Congressional Quarterly’s 1997
Guide to the United States Supreme Court, the 1999 Oxford Guide to Supreme Court Decisions, and the 2005 Legal Information Institute list.64 In
58. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 178–79.
59. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 20.
60. Id. (emphasis in original); accord Kleinberg, supra note 57, at 611 (“Hubs and authorities exhibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good hub is a page that points to many
good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to by many good hubs.”) (emphasis in original).
61. Widely available software for conducting network analysis and creating data visualizations,
such as the open-source application Gephi, https://gephi.org/, computes authority and hub scores as a
matter of routine. I used Gephi to compute the authority scores and create the visualizations presented
below.
62. The Spaeth data set has provided the basis for a wealth of political science research on Supreme
Court decision making. For a rich exploration of the core findings in the field, the interested reader should
see Epstein et al., supra note 31, at chs. 2–3, 6.
63. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 23 tbl.3.
64. Id. at 20 (describing these sources), 23 tbl.3 note.
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addition, annualized graphs of individual case’s authority scores do a stunningly effective job charting the way that overruling precedents rise up and
displace the authority of the cases they overrule,65 and the way that a case’s
importance can rise and fall as the issue-set of interest to the Court shifts
over time.66 The Kleinberg authority score serves, in
short, as a valid measure of a case’s importance within a
citation network of judicial opinions.
A streamlined example with a hypothetical set of
case citations helps illustrate the authority score as a network centrality metric. The earliest case in the line is A.
Subsequent cases B, C, D, and E each cite to A. E also
cites to B, as do cases F, G, and H. All told, the cases
run from A to O; one can list those that cite outward to
earlier cases in a column labeled “Source,” and those
that receive cites inward from later cases in a column
labeled “Target.” In the network analysis literature, this
is known as an edge list.67 Figure 1 fully states the edge
list for this simple case citation network.
Using network analysis and graphing software,
such as Gephi,68 one can also visualize the nodes and
edges of this network in varied of ways.69 A common Figure 1: Illustrative
form of visualization uses a mapping algorithm to spread Edge List for a Citaout nodes and edges in a readable way. The algorithm I tion Network
used to create the visualizations presented here—
ForceAtlas2—provides “a force directed layout: it simulates a physical system in order to spatialize a network. Nodes repulse each other like charged
particles, while edges attract their nodes, like springs. The forces create a
movement that converges to a balanced state.”70 The network graph depicts
that balanced state. To better understand the clustering of nodes within the
network, one can also apply a separate algorithm for “community detection,”
i.e., “divid[ing] the vertices” or nodes “so that the groups formed are tightly

65. Id. at 25–26, 26 fig.7.
66. Id. at 26–27, 27 figs.8 & 9; see also id. at 28 (“[A]uthority scores conform to qualitative assessments about which issues and cases the Court prioritizes and how these change over time”).
67. See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 300–01.
68. See Gephi, supra note 61.
69. See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 8 (“Visualization can be an extraordinarily useful tool in the
analysis of network data, allowing one to see instantly important structural features of a network that
would otherwise be difficult to pick out of the raw data.”).
70. Mathieu Jacomy et al., ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy Network
Visualization Designed for the Gephi Software, 9(6) PLOS ONE 2 (2014).
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knit with many edges inside [the]
groups and only a few edges between groups.”71 Gephi provides
both a community detection algorithm and a convenient means for
assigning a common color to the
nodes and edges in a given case
cluster. Applying this algorithm,
known as Modularity, to the nodes
in a ForceAtlas2 map of the citations in Figure 1 produces a graph
with three clusters. The map is in
Figure 2. All the nodes, and their
labels, are the same size.
Figure 2
What of the authority-score data? Before looking at the scores Gephi
computes for this network,
Node
Authority Score Hub Score
consider the matter intuitively.
C
0.5998
0.1635
Cases A, C, and D each have an
D
0.5549
0.1635
in-degree of 5, compared to
Case B’s in-degree of 4; their
A
0.4741
0
authority scores should be
B
0.2434
0.1635
higher than B’s. Cases E
K
0.2197
0.3981
through O each have an in-deO
0
0.6373
gree of 0; their authority scores
H
0
0.2907
should be 0. Case O has an outE
0
0.2474
degree of 4, so its hub score
I
0
0.2068
should be high. Case A cites
J
0
0.2068
nothing, so its hub score should
L
0
0.1913
be 0. Finally, Case C is cited by
both Cases O (likely to have a
M
0
0.1913
high hub score) and K (itself
N
0
0.1913
cited by O, boosting its centralF
0
0.0839
ity), suggesting it may have the
G
0
0.0839
highest authority score. These
surmises are borne out by the
Table 1: Authority and Hub Scores for Network
authority and hub scores for the
in Figure 1.

71. NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 354; see also id. at 378 (observing that “‘communities’ are defined
to be the natural groupings of vertices in networks,” and that “we would like to be able to find them
whatever their number”).
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network, which are listed in Table
1 in descending order of authority
score, then hub score.
We can also modify the network map to depict the authority
scores. Gephi permits one to vary
node and text size according to a
metric associated with the nodes.
Thus, I can change the map so that
both node size and node label vary
in direct proportion to a node’s authority score. Important nodes
stand out more. The revised map is
Figure 3
in Figure 3. (One could, alternatively, create a map with nodes that vary with hub score.)
With this illustration as a backdrop, it is time to put the Supreme Court’s
recent IP decisions in the context of a longer time span. The root data here
are citations from Supreme Court IP cases decided after argument, to other
Supreme Court cases of any doctrinal type. The overall set has source cases
decided between 1947 and 2017, inclusive.72 There are also two subsets covering 35 years, 1947 to 1981 and 1982 to 2017. One can generate, for each
of these three edge lists, a rank-ordered list of cases/nodes by authority score,
as well as a map to visualize the network. Comparing these three views, one
can see how much the 1982–2017 citation network changed the 1947–1981
citation network to yield the 1947–2017 citation network.
In gathering the citation data, I defined the category “IP cases” broadly.
It includes not only cases decided under the Patent Act, Copyright Act, and
Lanham Act, but also cases that turn in a material way on the scope of IP
rights—cases such FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,73 an antitrust case about whether a
type of patent-litigation-settlement agreement can trigger Sherman Act liability; and Zacchini, the right-of-publicity case discussed earlier.74 I identified the cases using computer searches (in the Westlaw database) of the
Court’s decisions during the relevant time period, with search terms such as
72. The full edge list, for the 1947–2017 cases, is available as an Excel file on this Journal’s Scholarly Commons website. The URL is https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol17/iss2/1/.
73. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
74. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. The right of publicity is conventionally understood to be an intellectual-property right. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28:8 (5th ed.) (“The law of the right of publicity bears some resemblance to the law of
trademarks and service marks. Both areas are ‘intellectual property’ and are properly placed within that
family of laws dubbed ‘unfair competition.’”) (footnote omitted).
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“Patent Act,” “Copyright Act,” “Lanham Act,” and “(licens! or infring! or
valid! or invalid!) /s (patent or copyright or trademark).” I also relied on my
familiarity with the cases from teaching them in IP courses or antitrust
courses (which I have done continuously, in one form or fashion, since
2001), as well as lists of Supreme Court IP cases maintained by others that
are readily available through internet search.
I compiled the list of citations to target cases from the source IP cases
by reading the opinion(s) in the case and recording each Supreme Court case
cited one or more times therein. A case cited five times gets one entry on the
edge list, just as a case cited once does; put differently, the study does not
measure citation intensity within source cases. Importantly, for each source
IP case, I included in its list of target citations all the cited cases, no matter
where those cited cases first appeared—in a majority opinion, a concurrence,
or a dissent. All the opinions in a case, together, embody the full Supreme
Court’s encounter with a case and present the full Court’s stated explanation
for its disposition of the case. Each citation is the authoring justice’s freely
chosen indication that the cited case is an influence in what that justice views
as the proper publicly stated ground for the prudent disposition of the case.75
That citing act, publicly stated, makes the citation linkage a thread in the
fabric of the law. For the same reason, I included all the relevant target citations without respect to the stated reason, if any, for the citation, or the degree
to which the source case expressly analyzed or distinguished the target
case.76
In the citation network compiled from Supreme Court IP cases from
1947 to 2017, there are 1,610 nodes and 2,867 edges. Of those case nodes,
181 have an out degree of 1 or more, i.e., are source cases. The network
compiled from the 1947–1981 subset has 658 nodes and 1,204 edges, with
81 source cases (i.e., cases with an out degree of 1 or more). The network
compiled from the 1982–2017 subset has 1,145 nodes and 1,663 edges, with
100 source cases.
Beginning with the 1982–2017 network, which includes the present period of increased Supreme Court attention to patent law, the median authority
75. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 A M. L. &
ECON. REV. 381, 386 (2000) (“It can signify an acknowledgment of priority or influence, a useful source
of information, a focus of disagreement, an acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of
the cited work or its author. All of these are forms of influence, in a broad sense, and that may be enough
to justify lumping them together for purposes of citations studies concerned with measuring influence.”).
76. See William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 273 (1998) (“We have not distinguished between favorable,
critical, or distinguishing citations. It is not clear that we should. Critical citations . . . are also a gauge of
influence since it is easier to ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for not following
it.”).
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score among all 1,145 case nodes in this subset is 0.0056. The top 30 authority scores range from 0.2535 to 0.0928. Those top 30 cases and their authority scores are provided in Table 2. Most are IP cases, and 12 were decided in
1980 or later.
In the 1947–1981 network, the median authority score among all 658
case nodes is 0.0042. The top 30 authority scores range from 0.2736 to
0.0907. Those top 30 cases and their authority scores are provided in Table
3. Many are antitrust cases, and none were decided after 1950 (though 19
were decided in the 1940s). This is, in other words, quite a different top-30authorities list from that of the 1982–2017 network. Indeed, there are only
two cases common to both lists: Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co.,77 ranked #15 in the 1982–2017 network and #11 in the 1947–
1981 network; and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,78 ranked #22
in the 1982–2017 network and #27 in the 1947–1981 network.
We can see this difference in visualization maps of these two networks.
I generated maps for each network and, using the community detection algorithm, applied a common color palette to both (in descending order of
community size, measured in number of constituent nodes). I filtered the
nodes to remove all but the top 100 nodes by authority score, then applied
the force-mapping algorithm to that top-100 group (setting node and label
size to vary directly with authority score). The top-100 map for the 1982–
2017 network (containing 102, or 8.9%, of 1,145 nodes) is in Figure 4, and
the top-100 map for the 1947–1981 network (containing 100, or 15.2%, of
658 nodes) is in Figure 5. They bear little resemblance to one another.

77. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
78. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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Case Node
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats (1989)
Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966)
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984)
Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken (1975)
Grant v. Raymond (1832)
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. (1998)
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (1974)
Mazer v. Stein (1954)
Harper & Row, Publ’rs v. Nation Enters. (1985)
The Trade-Mark Cases (1879)
Fox Film v. Doyal (1932)
Pennock v. Dialogue (1829)
Wheaton v. Peters (1834)
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l (2001)
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel (1964)
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. (1938)
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner† (1921)
Brenner v. Manson (1966)
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948)
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. (1991)
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (1996)
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989)
Stewart v. Abend (1990)
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980)
McClurg v. Kingsland (1843)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (1994)

Vol 17:2

Authority Score
0.2535
0.2027
0.1918
0.1792
0.1651
0.1646
0.1634
0.1619
0.1517
0.1461
0.1460
0.1365
0.1281
0.1267
0.1256
0.1227
0.1213
0.1199
0.1193
0.1186
0.1136
0.1097
0.1075
0.1027
0.0962
0.0959
0.0957
0.0955
0.0928
0.0928

Table 2: Top 30 Cases in the 1982–2017 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score

† Eisner has been made famous by Justice Holmes’ quip, in this challenge to the constitutionality of a
federal estate tax, that on some points of law “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921). As of February 2018, the query “(‘page of history’ /s ‘volume of logic) /p Eisner” in
Westlaw’s SCT database yields 17 cases spanning seven decades.
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Case Node
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (1944)
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940)
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States (1947)
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. (1942)
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. (1942)
United States v. Masonite Corp. (1942)
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States (1945)
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. (1947)
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp. (1931)
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co. (1947)
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917)
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940)
United States v. Univis Lens Co. (1942)
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. (1947)
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948)
Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (1944)
IBM v. United States (1936)
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. (1945)
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States (1911)
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis (1942)
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (1922)
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.
(1947)
United States v. General Elec. Co. (1926)
United States v. Line Material Co. (1948)
Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co. (1902)
Kendall v. Winsor (1859)
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948)
Pope v. Gormully (1892)
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co. (1911)
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939)
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Authority Score
0.2736
0.2350
0.2199
0.2140
0.2051
0.1872
0.1830
0.1813
0.1798
0.1626
0.1550
0.1472
0.1416
0.1409
0.1325
0.1276
0.1243
0.1230
0.1160
0.1131
0.1116
0.1103
0.1087
0.1056
0.1049
0.0976
0.0973
0.0942
0.0912
0.0907

Table 3: Top 30 Cases in the 1947–1981 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score
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Figure 4: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1982–2017 Network
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Figure 5: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1947–1981 Network

Now consider the full 1947–2017 network. The median authority score
among all 1,610 case nodes is 0.0014. The top 30 authority scores range from
0.2657 to 0.924. Those top 30 cases and their authority scores are provided
in Table 4. This list has a large degree of overlap with the top-30 list for the
1947–1981 network, notwithstanding the addition of all the citation data
from the 1982–2017. Indeed, there are 26 cases in the top 30 authority scores
of both the 1947–1981 and 1947–2017 networks, though many are in different ordinal positions. The only four cases in the top 30 of the 1947–2017
network, that do not also appear in the 1947–1981 network’s top 30, are Graham v. John Deere Co.79 (#23 in Table 4, and #2 in Table 2 (the 1982-2017

79. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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network)); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.80 (#26 in Table 4); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel81 (#28 in Table 4, and #16 in Table 2); and Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.82 (#30 in Table 4). This great overlap cannot be dismissed on the ground that older cases, having been available
longer, simply garnered more inward citations. If that were the case, the correlation between a case’s authority score and decisional year would be
strongly negative—higher authority scores would pair to earlier (smaller)
calendar-year values. That is not true here. The Pearson’s r between authority score and decisional year for the top 50 cases in the 1947–2017 network
is 0.295. (In the 1947–1981 network, this r is 0.306, and in the 1982–2017
network this r is -0.043.)
By like token, the map of the 1947–2017 network’s top 100 authorityscore nodes much more closely resembles the map for the 1947–1981 top
100 than it does the map for the 1982–2017 top 100. (Again, I applied the
same color palette to all three maps, in descending order of community size
measured in number of constituent nodes.) The map for the 1947–2017 network—containing 100, or 6.2%, of 1,1610 nodes—is in Figure 6. The 1982–
2017, in isolation, looks sharply different.83 The citations that join the map
as the years progress from 1982 to 2017 are woven into an already dense set
of citations. In the context of a full sweep from 1947 to 2017, current citations bring gradual change.

80. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
81. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
82. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
83. This disparate appearance is not a quirk of the 1982–2017 map. If one were to take, for example,
different 20-year segments of citation data, with no overlapping years, the resulting maps would differ.
Appendix B, infra, provides a pair of maps that, in their contrast to one another, illustrate the point.
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Case Node
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (1944)
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. (1942)
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940)
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States (1947)
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917)
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp. (1931)
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. (1942)
United States v. Masonite Corp. (1942)
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. (1947)
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States (1945)
United States v. Univis Lens Co. (1942)
United States v. National Lead Co. (1947)
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948)
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940)
IBM v. United States (1936)
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. (1947)
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948)
Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (1944)
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. (1945)
Kendall v. Winsor (1859)
United States v. General Elec. Co. (1926)
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (1922)
Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966)
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States (1911)
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis (1942)
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. (1912)
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.
(1947)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel (1964)
United States v. Line Material Co. (1948)
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.
(1950)
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Authority Score
0.2657
0.2175
0.2149
0.2072
0.2026
0.1849
0.1803
0.1784
0.1635
0.1574
0.1500
0.1356
0.1280
0.1255
0.1237
0.1216
0.1214
0.1155
0.1142
0.1110
0.1072
0.1049
0.1036
0.1011
0.1005
0.0997
0.0985
0.0984
0.0941
0.0924

Table 4: Top 30 Cases in the 1947–2017 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score

398

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:2

Figure 6: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1947–2017 Network

To close, Mr. Waxman is surely right to caution that the Court should
avoid approaching patent law in a way that “‘disrupt[s] the settled expectations of the inventing community.’”84 Those expectations, in turn, are a function of the different perspectives from which observers take stock of the pace
and scale of change in the Court’s decisions. Put in the larger context of the
case-law influences that the Court itself inscribes in its patent law and other
IP decisions, which network analysis allows us systematically to assess, the
changes of the last 35 years have been neither so fast nor so large as to tear
a gap in the larger web of IP law.
84. Waxman, supra note 2, at 225 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)).
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APPENDIX A
Below is a list of the Supreme Court’s decisions in copyright (C), patent
(P), and trademark (T) cases from its October 1994 Term through its October
2016 Term, inclusive. The list states, for each case, the number of votes for
the majority outcome, as well as any concurrences in or dissents from that
outcome. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order, by type (C, P, or
T).
Name

Vol

Rprtr

137

S. Ct.

1002

5

1

2

C

136

S. Ct.

1979

8

0

0

C

ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.

134

S. Ct.

2498

6

0

3

C

Petrella v. MGM, Inc.

134

S. Ct.

1962

6

0

3

C

568

U.S.

519

6

2

3

C

565

U.S.

302

6

0

2

C

559

U.S.

154

5

3

0

C

545

U.S.

913

9

3|3

0

C

537

U.S.

186

7

0

2

C

533

U.S.

483

7

0

2

C

523

U.S.

340

8

1

0

C

523

U.S.

135

9

1

0

C

137

S. Ct.

1664

9

1

0

P

137

S. Ct.

1523

7

1

1

P

137

S. Ct.

1514

8

0

0

P

137

S. Ct.

954

7

0

1

P

137

S. Ct.

734

5

2

0

P

Star Athletica, LLC v.
Varsity Brands, Inc.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
Golan v. Holder
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick
MGM Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.
Eldred v. Ashcroft
New York Times Co. v.
Tasini
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.
Quality King Distribs. v.
L’Anza Res. Int’l
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.
Impression Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft
Foods Group Brands LLC
SCA Hygiene Prods. v.
First Quality Baby Prods.
Life Techs. Corp. v.
Promega Corp.

Page

Mjrty

Cncr

Dssnt

Type
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137

S. Ct.

429

8

0

0

P

136

S. Ct.

2131

7

1

2

P

136

S. Ct.

1923

9

3

0

P

135

S. Ct.

2401

6

0

3

P

135

S. Ct.

1920

6

0

2

P

135

S. Ct.

831
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* These cases are not included in footnote 8 of the Waxman article.
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APPENDIX B
Below are two citation maps using the citations from subsets of the 1947–2017
data. Each map covers a 20-year period and shows the cases with the top 100 authority scores for that period. The first covers 1960 to 1979, the second covers 1980
to 1999.

Appendix B 1: Top 100 Authority Scores, 1960–1979
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Appendix B 2: Top 100 Authority Scores, 1980–1999
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